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This paper analyzes the impact of downward wage rigidity on the labor mar-
ket. It shows that imposing downward wage rigidity in a matching model with
cyclical uctuations in productivity, endogenous match-destruction, and on-the-
job search, quits are procyclical and layos countercyclical. It provides evidence
that downward wage rigidity is empirically relevant in ten European countries.
It nally shows that layos are countercyclical and quits are procyclical, as pre-
dicted by the model.
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1 Introduction
Downward wage rigidity has traditionally been a central concern in labor economics.1
There are several reasons why rms may be reluctant to cut wages. Firms may be con-
strained by ecient nominal wage contracts (MacLeod and Malcomson 1993, Holden
1999), fairness standards (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986, Campbell and Kam-
lani 1997) and the existence of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Concerning empirical work on downward wage rigidity in Europe, there is now a
fairly large and rapidly growing literature base. Devicienti, Maida and Sestito (2007)
investigate downward wage rigidity in Italy, Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) in Germany,
Holden (1998) in the Nordic countries, Agell and Lundborg (2003) in Sweden, Smith
(2000) and Nickell and Quintini (2003) in the UK. There are also some multicountry
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1See Bauer, Goette and Sunde (2007) for a brief survey of the literature.
1studies based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) in Dessy (2002)
and Beissinger and Knoppik (2009).
One of the limitations of studies using large nationally representative datasets is
that they generally identify wage rigidity by the percent of respondents that experience
a decline in nominal wages while working for the same employer in interviews a year
apart. Self-reported wages gathered in two dierent interviews can lead to spurious
changes in wages due to measurement error.
In this paper, I rst add to this branch of literature by providing robust evidence
of downward wage rigidity for ten European Countries using the ECHP.2 Downward
wage rigidity is detected by analyzing the relationship between wages and general eco-
nomic conditions. The rationale of this strategy is to measure whether wages respond
dierently when conditions improve than when conditions decline.3
One question that emerges from this evidence is what the implications of wage
rigidity on job duration are. If rms are not free to trigger renegotiation, when there
is a cut on demand or a decrease in productivity, they will not be able to maintain the
job. Therefore we should observe an eect of business cycles over job breaks.
There has been an extensive research assessing the importance of business cycle
uctuations over labor market outcomes in relation to job nding and job destruction
rates. Davis, Haltiwanger and Shub (1996) indicate that unemployment inows and
outows are very volatile and cyclical. Using U.S. rm level data they nd that unem-
ployment is clearly countercyclical, that layos account for most of its cyclical change
and that quits increase in expansions and decline moderately during recessions.
Analyzing U.S. data, Shimer (2007) concludes that uctuations in the destruction
rate account for 25 percent of the variation in the unemployment rate. Fujita and
Ramey (2009) claim that contemporaneous uctuations in the separation rate explain
40 to 50 percent of the uctuations in unemployment, depending on how the data are
detrended.
In this paper, I formally discuss the relationship between rigidity, layos and quits,
using a matching model framework. Equilibrium search, and matching models have
primarily omitted business cycles and wage renegotiation. In the textbook versions
of search-matching models once the agent and the rm have formed a match, as the
economy is stationary, the surplus remains constant. Therefore, there is no reason to
set rules for renegotiation.4
In the model presented in this paper, wages are set by Nash Bargaining in new
matches. For ongoing matches, when conditions deteriorate surplus is not split in
2I analyze information of Austria, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy,
Greece, Spain and Portugal.
3These measures are robust to measurement error in self-reported wages. Wages are in the left
hand side of our regressions, whenever the measurement error in wages is iid, estimates are unbiased.
4For good examples of classical search and matching models see Wolpin (1995) and Pissarides
(1985).
2the same proportions than in new matches, because rms are not allowed to trigger
renegotiation. Allowing dierent wage setting mechanisms when the worker is an
insider and when the worker is an outsider may be more consistent with some features
of European institutions than continuous Nash bargaining. Firms and workers have
no commitment when they are setting wages in the beginning of the match. Due to
severance payments and diculty of dismissal regulations, rms are not allowed to
costlessly break the relationship. Hence the bargaining process in ongoing matches
could dier from the one of new matches. Imposing some rigidity is also consistent
with Shimer (2005), who argues that search and matching models, where wages are
determined by continuous Nash bargaining cannot generate substantial movements
along a downward sloping Beveridge curve in response to shocks to productivity of a
plausible magnitude. Therefore, some models with more rigid wages are needed.
This paper proposes a model with cyclical uctuations in productivity, endogenous
job-termination and on-the-job search where downward wage rigidity is imposed. By
means of simulating the model, I show that it predicts procyclical quits, countercyclical
layos and countercyclical unemployment rates. I also show that with a reasonable
parametrization, the model partially tackles the critique presented by Shimer (2005)
on the scarce variability of vacancies and unemployment.
Using microdata from the same set of ten European countries, I analyze the cycli-
cal patterns of job termination. The estimates of the separation model imply a strong
negative relationship between unemployment rates and quits at the European level.
I also nd a signicantly positive eect of the unemployment rate over the probabil-
ity of layos. These results suggest that in Europe, quits are procyclical and layos
countercyclical, as predicted by the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section
2. In Section 3, I describe the dataset. Section 4 presents two alternative empirical
approaches to detect downward wage rigidity and the empirical strategy to measure the
cyclical patterns of job terminations. Results for both, the pooled sample of countries
and for each country individually are also presented in this section. Section 5 discusses
the results and informally connects these results with the institutional background of
each country. Section 6 concludes and presents recommendations for future research.
2 The Model
The labor market is described by a matching model with cyclical uctuations in produc-
tivity, on-the-job search and endogenous match-destruction. To Introduced a cyclical
component in the model is not trivial. There is not consensus on how much exibility
to allow on wages. There has been two main streams. One possible direction is to
consider that one job is one wage and to not allow any renegotiation. Lippman and
Mamer (1989) for example, set up cyclical variation in a rigid wage search model where
3no renegotiation is permitted. Their model predicts procyclical quits but says nothing
about layos. The opposite direction is to allow for continuous Nash bargaining, where
wages are consequently governed by the actual market condition. Mortensen (1994)
considers a matching model with two sources of variation. It predicts countercyclical
layos and procyclical quits.5 The model presented in this section is halfway between
both positions, wages can only be renegotiated upward.
The model builds on the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), but now rms are het-
erogeneous and wages are assumed to be downward rigid. Each rm has a job that
can be lled, or vacant and searching. Jobs that are not searching for a worker or
producing are destroyed. Similarly, workers can be producing or searching. To search
while employed is also allowed like in Mortensen (1993).6 I assume that searching while
working is less productive than searching when the worker is unemployed.
Figure 1: Wage Setting Dynamics
At the moment of hiring, the wage is chosen so as to split the current surplus in
xed proportion. I impose downward wage rigidity, hence if the surplus change, the
wage response will be asymmetric, see Figure 1. There are two cases, if conditions
improve the worker renegotiates to maintain her proportion of the new surplus and the
wage raises. If conditions deteriorate the rm has to aord the whole loss meanwhile
the value of the job remains positive.7
5Mortensen (1994) imputes a layo when both parts break the match due to the surplus extinction.
This denition might not be complete if we think in a layo as a job destruction initiated by the rm.
6This on-the-job search only implies that it is not necessary to be unemployed to look for a new
job, it is not the same oer and counter-oer scheme like in Burdett-Mortensen (1998). The outside
option is always the unemployment.
7I consider a layo as a match break initiated by the rm and a quit as a match break initiated
by the worker.
4Let me assume that the net output of a rm-worker match i at time t is the sum
of a xed productivity p that is constant across matches and time, plus an aggregate
component that depends on the state of the economy. The state of the economy, yt is
time specic, and its dynamic between t and t + 1 is described by a transition func-
tion F(yt+1jyt) with lower bound yd and upper bound yu. The elasticity of the match
productivity to the state of the economy is heterogeneous and is denoted by i. This
elasticity is the only source of heterogeneity between rms and it is exogenously dis-
tributed according to a given cumulative distribution function G(). The productivity
of a match with elasticity i in time t is p + iyt.8
The productivity of each match and its opportunity cost at t depend on the current
economic conditions yt. As I have assumed that the wage is downward rigid, the best
wage of each spell is a state variable valuing each match. As the wage is monotonous
respect to yt, the best wage can be fully characterized by the match sensibility i and
the best general economic condition of each spell y
i;t.9 Therefore there are three state
variables that determine the value of a job: yt that is time specic, i that is match
specic and y
i;t that is time and match specic.
When a match is created yt = y
i;t, hence the expected value of the job for the rm,
when it posts a vacancy, and the expected value of a job for the worker when she is
searching, are only functions of the current economic conditions yt. When the current
macroeconomic condition is known, the worker and the rm have the option to break
the relationship, being the unemployment and a vacancy their outside options.10 The
worker decides to search or not search for a job in the current period and if she nds,
she start working with the new job in the following period.
Finally, let me assume a constant returns to scale matching function m(v(yt);u(yt)),
and free entry condition, that in this context means that there is an innite number
of rms that go into the market until the exhaustion of all rents.
2.1 Value Functions
The unemployed worker searches only if the expected value of searching is greater than








8This a simple way to generate heterogeneity on rms whose positions in the distribution of rms
may change if the outside conditions change. To have changes in the relative position is important
to generate quits. If a better state of the economy improves every rm homogeneously, as the rank is
preserved, the worker would never quit.
9The best economic condition is representative of the highest wage if our parametrization of the
model consider only procyclical productivity for every match. If a particular match productivity were
countercyclical the worst economic condition would have to be considered. In the simulations of the
model the latter case does not occur.
10I assume that the cyclicality of each match is not observable until the match is done. This is not
a critical assumption but it clearly simplies the algebra avoiding directed search.
5therefore the value of unemployment, U(yt), is dened as:








































where r is the interest rate, b is the unemployment benet, c1 is the cost of searching
and W (yt+1;yt+1;i) is the value of a new job, which depends on three states variables,
yt+1, y
i;t+1 that is newly created match is equal to yt+1 and i. The unemployed worker
decides to search if the expected value of the job over the conditional distribution of
yt+1 plus the cost of searching is greater than the expected value of the vacancy.
Notice that given the state of the economy, not every job is going to be protable.
What is equivalent to say that given the sensitivity of the match, , the match is going
to be protable only in some states of the economy y. R() represents the threshold
on the space y over which a match with sensitivity  is protable.11 Given that there
is free entry of rms, the value of a vacancy is zero, and therefore the threshold R()
is implicitly dened by the following equation:
J(R();R();) = 0;
where J(yt;y
i;t;i) is the value of a match for the rm when the economy is in state
yt, the best state of the economy of the spell is y
i;t and the sensitivity to the cycle of
the match is i.
The value of a job for the worker is equal to the wage, w(y
i;t;i); received today plus
the future value of the job. The future value of the job depends on the decisions that
the worker takes today and the expected decisions that the rm will take tomorrow
conditional on yt. The worker has to decide if it is protable to quit or to stay in the
job. If she chooses to stay she has to decide between searching from the job or staying
without searching.
To sum up, the worker has to decide between:
 To quit: If the expected value of unemployment is greater than the value of
staying in the job.
 To stay: If the value of staying is greater than the value of quitting. The value
of staying depends on the options the worker takes:
{ On-the-job Search: If the value of searching () is greater than the value
of not searching (
), the worker searches. In the latter case she receives an
11As usual  F(R()jyt) = 1   F(R()jyt).
6oer with probability w(
v(yt)
u(yt)); where  is the reduction in the searching
eciency due to search while working. As usual, the worker will quit if it is
in her own convenience. The worker pays a cost c2 if she search on the job.
{ No Search: If the value of searching is smaller than the value of not search-
ing, the worker does not search. If the worker does not quit nor searches
or if her search has not been successful, tomorrow she will face the value of
her current job but in a dierent state of the economy yt+1: As wages can
not be cut o, there are three possible cases:
 If yt+1 goes below a threshold R(y
i;t;i); where the value of this job for
the rm would falls below the value of a vacancy, the worker will be
dismissed,
 If yt+1 is between R(y
i;t;i) and y
i;t, there is no change on the best
economic condition of the spell, and the wage does not change.
 If yt+1 is greater than the current maximum y
i;t, the match has a new
maximum y
i;t+1 = yt+1:, and the wage raises.
Therefore, the value of a job when the economy is in state yt, the best state of the
economy of the spell has been y























































i;t;i)   c2; (1)
The threshold R(y
i;t;i) identies when the worker will be dismissed and is implic-






Notice that the rst line of (1) represents the expected utility of the worker in the
case she receives an oer and the state of economy is better than R(y
i;t;i). In such
event, the worker can choose to accept or reject the oer. If the value of her current
job is higher than the value of the alternative job, she rejects the oer and she keeps
7her current job. the second line of (1) represents the expected utility of the worker
in the case she receives an oer and the state of economy is worse than R(y
i;t;i).
In this case the worker can reject the oer but her outside option is the value of the
unemployment. The third line of (1) represents the expected utility of the worker if
she does not receive any oer, minus the cost of searching on the job.
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The value of a job for the rm has practically the same structure as the value of a
job for the worker. The main dierence is that when the match breaks, the rm gets
the value of a vacancy. The value of a vacancy is only function of the current economic
condition, because y
i;t+1 and i are match specic. The vacancy is going to be lled












The value of a vacancy, V (yt), is dened by:



























i;t+1 = yt+1;) is the value of a new match for the rm and r is the
interest rate. V (yt) is the sum of three terms:
 The cost of the vacancy, c3:
 The expected value, over the distribution of yt+1 conditional on yt, of the vacancy
tomorrow times the probability of this event.
 The expected value, over the join distribution of yt+1 and i given yt; of a match,
times the probability of getting a worker.
















i;t;i) is the expected value of the match for the rm if the worker is
searching and (yt;y
i;t;i) is the expected value of the job for the rm if the worker
is not searching. Due to the free entry condition, the value of a vacancy is zero.
	(yt;y




























































1[W(y;y;) < W(y;y;i)]J(y;y;i)dG()dF(yjyt)g (2)
where 1(:) is an indicator function that takes the value one if the condition holds.
Note that the second row in (2) is the expected value of the job for the rm, if the
worker does not receive any oer. The third line in (2) represents the value of the job
if the worker receives an oer but she rejects it, being the economy in a state worse
than y
i;t. The fourth line in (2) represents the value of the job if the worker receives



















































This equation implicitly denes the equilibrium ratio of vacancies to searching work-
ers, v(yt)=u(yt); a measure of market tightness.
92.2 Wages
When the rm and the worker create a new match, the wage is determined splitting the




i;t;i)   U(yt). The main dierence with standard matching models is that
now the surplus splitting rule is only relevant when yt = y
i;t: If yt < y
i;t, as wages
are downward rigid, the rm loses part of its fraction of the surplus, and the Nash
bargaining with the original  and (1   ) does not describe the surplus splitting.12
2.3 Simulations
Figure 2: Simulated variables
Figure 2 presents simulated behaviors of quits, layos, employment levels and mean
wage.13 I simulate the value function in discrete time by the xed point algorithm by
value function iterations.14 The model predicts procyclical quits. Moreover, due to
the on-the-job search, quits are persistent during the expansion. Persistence is an
interesting features of the model and it is not trivial to be generated. In the model
of Wright (1986), for example, considering signal extraction, there is also persistence
because quits occur as employees learn about the true nature of their jobs. In this
model the persistence is due to the fact that the probability of nding a job while
searching is not one, there are people that search while working during the expansion
but the transition is only produced when the worker eectively nds a better job.
12see Figure 1
13See Section A1 for details on the parametrization and distributional assumption made on these
simulations.
14I simulate the model with 10,000 individuals and 500 time periods. The convergence is very quick.
The whole program takes approximately four hours to run.
10Layos are clearly countercyclical. Due to the downward rigidity, some matches
that have set wages during the expansion are not able to continue when the economic
conditions fall down and have to be destroyed.
Changes on employment are clearly procyclical as expected. The model also pre-
dicts procyclicality on mean-wages, on the mean-wage block of Figure 2, we observe
two dierent kinds of responses:
 Movements on the mean that occur in the same state of the cycle is mainly due
to the composition eect generated by the fact that people on good jobs does not
search, this fact produce selection within the cycle.
 Movements on the mean that occur when there has been an upward change on
the cyclical state is mainly due to the renegotiation,
Shimer (2005) argues that the textbook search and matching model cannot generate
the observed business-cycle-frequency uctuations in unemployment and job vacancies
in response to shocks to productivity of a plausible magnitude. With a simple numerical
exercise I show that imposing downward wage rigidity in a matching model with cyclical
uctuations in productivity and on-the-job search may help to tackle this critic.
Calibration's details are in the appendix. I nd that vacancies are approximately
three times more variable than productivity and that unemployment is almost ve
times more volatile than productivity. The vacancy unemployment ratio varies more
than twice than productivity. The Mortensen-Pissarides's (1994) model predicts similar
volatility for the vacancy-unemployment ratio and productivity.15 The model is in the
good direction but is it not still able to generate enough variation in the latter ratio
that has been estimated to be around 20 times the variation in productivity.16
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
which is a large scale annual longitudinal survey providing household and personal
information on income and socioeconomic characteristics for 15 member states of the
European Union (EU). The ECHP has been centrally designed and coordinated by
the Statistical Oce of the European Union (Eurostat). The great advantage of the
ECHP is the uniform questionnaire asked in the EU-countries which makes the direct
comparison of data across countries and over time possible.
The ECHP started in 1994 and ended in 2001, thereby it comprise eight waves. In
the rst wave in 1994 a sample of about 60,000 nationally representative households
with approximately 130,000 individuals aged 16 years and over were interviewed in
15See Shimer (2005a).
16Estimates for the United States by Shimer (2005)
11the then 12 participating member States. Germany, UK and Luxembourg, have two
sources of information, ECHP and local national surveys: SOEP, BHPS, and PSELL
respectively. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the ECHP-project in 1995, 1996 and
1997, respectively. I analyze information of ten countries: Denmark, The Netherlands,
Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Austria.17
I have 770,000 observations distributed over eight waves. The analysis is conducted
for full time workers in the private sector. I exclude the rst and the last percentile of
the wage distribution in order to partially avoid outsider's interference. I nally have
approximately 180,000 observations of 64,635 individuals.
As a measure of the state of the economy I use the unemployment rate. To study
which labor market condition is the most relevant, I use three aggregated indicators,
the initial unemployment rate, the minimum unemployment rate of the each spell18
and the current unemployment rate which have been obtained from the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).19
Wages are at constant prices across time. I deate them by the consumer price
index from each country also obtained from the OECD. All real wages are considered
at year 2000 prices. The data give details on the net current monthly wage and salary
earnings of each individual.
Figure 3: Unemployment Rates - Country Samples (Data from OECD)
17See Peracchi (2002) for a good description of this data-set.
18As I have unemployment information since 1980, I am able to use observations whose reported
initial date is before the start of the survey in 1994.
19http://www.oecd.org
12When analyzing dynamics, I consider a job break if the worker has a new job or
if she has stopped her previous one between two consecutive waves. I am not able to
recognize if there has been more than one movement in this interval.20
One of the main problems of this sample is that, due to the short temporal dimen-
sion, in several countries there is not enough cyclical movements, measured in terms
of the unemployment rate evolution. On Figure 3, it can be seen that between 1994
and 2001 only Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal have had some change in their
unemployment rate short-term trend.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
This section presents country by country and pooled estimates. In Subsections 4.1 and
4.2, I present empirical evidence of downward wage rigidity. In the Subsection 4.3,
I show that business cycles also have important eects on probabilities of layo and
quit, and these eects are consistent with the model predictions presented in Figure 2.
Most of studies trying to detect downward wage rigidity with micro-data from
representative data sets, identify wage rigidity by the percent of respondents experience
a decline in nominal wages while working for the same employer in interviews a year
apart. One limitation of this approach is that self-reported wages gathered in two
dierent interviews can lead to spurious changes in wages, due to measurement error.
In this section I propose two empirical strategies to detect downward wage rigidity
that are robust to measurement error in self reported wages.
The rst one builds on an approach originally presented by Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991). Beaudry and DiNardo were originally concerned in studying whether market
conditions aect the wage setting. They tested three possible options: full renegotia-
tion, where both sides are able to renegotiate and therefore wages are totally exible.
A totally rigid market where only the initial conditions of each spell matter. And
an intermediate case, where wages are downward rigid and then, the best economic
condition of the spell is statistically sucient to explain the current wage. They nd
the last possibility to be the most relevant one. Similar studies have been done with
Canadian and British data by McDonald and Worswick (1999) and by Devereux and
Hart (2007), respectively. They have also found that the best economic condition eect
is relevant.
In a second approach presented in Section 4.2, I directly measure if wages respond
dierently when conditions improve than when conditions decline, trusting again in
the unemployment rate as an index of the state of the economy.
As in both approaches log-wages are in the left-hand side of the equations. There-
20In some countries there are important discrepancies between interview's date and the wave's year.
The whole analysis is made considering year of the interview instead of wave.
13fore, a standard multiplicative iid measurement error in self-reported wages21 would
not aect my estimates.
4.1 Downward Wage Rigidity: Best economic Condition Ef-
fect
In this subsection, I use the Beaudry and DiNardo's strategy to indirectly test for
downward wage rigidity in Europe. I test between three alternative hypothesis:
 Full Rigidity: If wages were totally rigid, the initial state of the economy would
be signicant in a wage equation.
 No Rigidity: If there is no rigidity wages will only be correlated with the current
economic conditions.
 Downward Rigidity: If rms are constrained to start renegotiations, the best









Ut+j Initial Unemployment rate
Ut Current Unemployment rate
min(Ut+k)
j
k=0 Minimum Unemployment rate
Where wi;t+j is the wage of an individual i on time t+j who began to work on time
t, that depends on her individual characteristic Xi, a relevant labor market condition
link variable C(t;j) and an error term.
The covariates Xi; used for estimation include age, tenure, education and dummies
for country, sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status.
Table 1 presents OLS and within-groups estimates of 
2 considering all countries
together. I replicate Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) analysis for real wages.
In the rst three columns, I present estimates for the pooled sample of ten Eu-
ropean countries without specifying the contract type. Results are consistent with
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). I nd signicant negative coecients for every variable
considered alone. As the three indicators are presumably correlated, I also show re-
gressions including three indicators together, the initial unemployment rate becomes
almost non-signicant. In row (5), I show results including the actual unemployment
rate and the minimum unemployment rate both coecients are signicantly dierent
from zero.
21That is an additive iid measurement error in log-wages.
14Table 1: Wage Rigidity - Pooled Sample
Log(monthly real wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.043 -0.003 0.001 -0.058 -0.002 -0.002 levels
(50.15)** (2.54)** (0.85) (57.88)** (1.64) (2.56)*
(2) -0.045 -0.055 levels
(97.56)** (96.22)**
(3) -0.037 -0.040 levels
(72.00)** (59.20)**
(4) -0.019 -0.013 levels
(38.82)** (22.91)**
(5) -0.040 -0.009 -0.051 -0.008 levels
(49.97)** (9.09)** (59.40)** (6.41)**
(6) 0.03 -0.024 -0.001 -0.021 job-xed
(1.61) (29.85)** (0.71) (25.06)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with
every type of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage
equation where only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of
t-statistics in parentheses.** signicant at 1 percent; * signicant at 5 percent. Controls for
age, tenure, education and dummies for country, sex, type of contract, marital status and
immigration status are included. Real wages have been deated to be expressed in year 2000
prices.
In row 6, coecients are reestimated using the same data but only exploiting within
job variation.22 Now, the minimum unemployment rate becomes the most important
job market indicator and the actual unemployment rate is not signicant. Results ob-
tained with this specication is consistent with the model and with results presented in
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) with U.S. data. There are signicant dierences between
OLS in levels and within groups.23 These dierences may be suggesting a positive cor-
relation between the state of the economy and the match unobservable characteristics
and is consistent with Bowlus (1995), where she nds that mismatching occurs more
during recessions.
Considering only permanent contracts, results do not change signicantly. The
main dierence is in row (1) where now the eect of the minimum unemployment rate
is only marginally signicant.
In Table 1, as in Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) and in Devereux and Hart (2005),
real wages are taken as the relevant measure of labor income. McDonald and Worswick
(1999) use nominal wages instead of real wages. Downward wage rigidity is generally
considered to be a nominal phenomena, thus nominal wage would also be a relevant
variable. In Table 2, I estimate previous specications but with log-nominal-wages.
22Note that within job variation partials out the eect on unobserved worker xed heterogeneity
and unobserved rm xed heterogeneity.
23Hausman tests reject the null at a 1 percent level for both samples.
15Table 2: Wage Rigidity - Pooled Sample
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.022 -0.011 0.000 -0.035 -0.004 -0.001 levels
(26.32)** (8.44)** (0.07) (35.98)** (2.60)** (1.65)
(2) -0.029 -0.036 levels
(64.74)** (64.33)**
(3) -0.029 -0.031 levels
(58.28)** (47.67)**
(4) -0.015 -0.011 levels
(31.58)** (19.12)**
(5) -0.021 -0.014 -0.030 -0.012 levels
(35.79)** (22.37)** (36.15)** (10.01)**
(6) -0.024 -0.011 -0.031 -0.009 job-xed
(41.45)** (15.68)** (50.23)** (10.82)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with
every type of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage
equation where only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of
t-statistics in parentheses.** signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure,
education and dummies for country, sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration
status are included.
When analyzing nominal wages, estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively equiv-
alent to results presented in Table 1. The minimum unemployment rate is always sig-
nicantly negative. The main dierence is in the estimated coecient of the current
economic condition, which is now signicantly dierent from zero in every specication.
These results show the importance of the best economic condition of each spell in the
wage setting, and consequently they prove the empirical relevance of downward wage
rigidity in Western Europe.
Table 3 presents results country by country. The initial unemployment rate has been
shown to be not signicant in wage equations once the current or the best economic
condition has been included, therefore Table 3 only presents specications where the
current and the minimum unemployment rate were considered.24 As before there are
signicant dierences when match xed eects are removed. In the equation in levels
the eect of the actual unemployment rate is always signicantly negative (but only
Greece) and the eect of minimum unemployment rate is signicantly negative in
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The eect of the
minimum unemployment rate is more homogeneous in the within-group estimates,
where I nd a negative and signicant eect of the best economic condition in every
24For estimates of all the previous specication, for nominal and real wages, see the appendix: Table
9 for Austria, Table 10 for Belgium, Table 11 for Denmark, Table 12 for France, Table 13 for Greece,
Table 14 for Ireland, Table 15 for Italy, Table 16 for The Netherlands, Table 17 for Portugal and Table
18 for Spain
16Table 3: Wage Rigidity - Country Samples
Log(monthly real wages)
OLS Within-Groups
Actual Minimum Actual Minimum
rate rate rate rate
Austria -0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.04
(8.47)** (2.86)** (3.80)** (3.97)**
Belgium -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(6.77)** (3.57)** (2.37)* (1.93)
Denmark -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.03
(1.82) (7.17)** (4.02)** (4.90)**
France -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03
(8.96)** (1.65) (1.36) (8.36)**
Greece 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.08
(18.61)** (8.51)** (12.80)** (7.97)**
Ireland -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.02
(1.86) (12.94)** (4.54)** (5.75)**
Italy -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(20.10)** (4.83)** (3.85)** (3.13)**
The Netherlands -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.02
(8.19)** (6.15)** (0.07) (5.02)**
Portugal -0.06 -0.00 0.01 -0.01
(32.81)** (0.30) (5.27)** (4.17)**
Spain -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
(14.40)** (9.72)** (0.20) (7.81)**
Note: Each row in the rst two columns represents a wage equation in levels for each coun-
try. Each row in the last two columns represents a within-match wage equation for each
country. Workers with every type of contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics
in parentheses.** signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education
and dummies for country, sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are
included. Real wages have been deated to be expressed in year 2000 prices.
country but only in the striking case of Greece.
4.2 Downward Wage Rigidity: Asymmetric response
Downward wage rigidity implies an asymmetric response of wages to changes in eco-
nomic conditions. Depending on the sign of the variation there will be dierent eects.
If conditions improve wages do react, but when conditions are worse, wages are inelas-
tic. An alternative way to check for this rigidity is to directly test for this asymmetry.
As before, I use the unemployment rate as an indicator of the state of the economy
and I test whether the elasticity of wages dier according to sign of the cycle.
In other words, I estimate a wage-equation allowing for dierent parameters of the










0 If Ut > Ut 1
1 If Ut  Ut 1;
and wi;t is the current real wage, Ut is the current unemployment rate and Xi;t are
observable characteristics of the match.
Table 4: Wage Asymmetric Response
log(monthly real wages)








0.006 -0.024 -0.060 0.007 -0.024 -0.063
(8.08)** (28.65)** (8.48)** (27.54)** (8.09)** (8.41)**
Note: Estimates of equation (4) for workers with every type of contracts are presented in the
rst three columns. Estimates of equation (4) only for workers with permanent contracts are
presented in the last three columns. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.** signicant
at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country, sex,
type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included. Real wages have been
deated to be expressed in year 2000 prices.
Results are presented in Table 4. I nd strong evidence of asymmetry. The dier-
ence between 
2 and 
3 is statistically dierent from zero. The eect of the actual
unemployment over wages in a growing economy is almost four times this eect in a
decreasing one. Estimates are very precise and I nd similar patterns between dierent
types of contracts. As expected 
1 is statistically positive showing that the growth
rate of wages is higher when the unemployment is decreasing.
4.3 Dynamics
As shown in Figure 2, the model predicts procyclicality on quits and countercyclicality
on layos. These implications are tested trusting again in the negative association
between state of the economy and unemployment rate.
To study the eect of the current unemployment rate on the probability of layo,
I estimate the discrete choice model tting a probit for each country and the pooled
sample.25 Results are shown in Table 5.
There is evidence of counter-cyclicality of layos. This evidence is stronger in the
pooled sample mainly due to scarce variation on unemployment rates at the country
level. I nd a signicantly positive eect of unemployment rate on layo probability
in Belgium, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands and Portugal.
25LOGIT and Conditional LOGIT have also been estimated with similar results.
18Table 5: Cyclical Patterns of Job-Termination
Probit Estimates
Probability of Layo Probability of Quit
Actual Actual























Note: Each row in the rst column shows probit estimates of the eect of the current un-
employment rate on the probability of layo for each country. Each row in the rst column
shows probit estimates of the eect of the current unemployment rate on the probability of
quit for each country. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.** signicant at 1%; *
signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country, sex, type of
contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
Quits are mainly found to be procyclical. As before, results are more conclusive
on the pooled sample where I nd a signicantly negative eect of the current unem-
ployment rate on the quit probability. I nd the same qualitative result for Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, The Netherlands and Spain but in most
of the cases with low signicance levels.
5 Discussion
Downward wage rigidity is an extreme case. Most of the estimates of the eect of
the current unemployment rate on wages, presented in Section 4, were also signicant.
19Therefore, there is a link between wages and current economic conditions. Intuition be-
hind these results suggests that workers are always able to renegotiate, therefore, when
conditions improve, they bargain for a new wage. However, rms are not as mobile as
workers. Hence, they are more constrained in wage renegotiations. Note that a model
where only the workers are able to renegotiate is not totally equivalent to the model
presented in Section 2. If only the workers are able to trigger renegotiations, wages
are not going to be totally downward rigid; they will partially depend on the current
economic conditions. This is because workers will try to avoid being dismissed; when
the surplus is still positive, they will agree on a lower wage. This mechanism, which
only imposes to the rm the requirement of a credible threat to trigger renegotiation,
is the asymmetric version of the wage renegotiation scenario described in Postel-Vinay
and Turon (2010), where both parties are required to have a credible threat to set a
new wage.
In summary, the prevalence the prevalence of the best economic condition eect
should be associated with constraints that limit a rm's capacity to renegotiate wages.
Possible causes of these constraints include the requirement of severance payments,
or other regulations, that make it dicult to dismiss workers. Note that also unions
may generate a dierence between the bargaining process of new matches and ongoing
matches since unions represent only insiders.
Table 6: Institutional Background
Diculty of Overall Strictness Union
Dismissal - DOD of Protection against Density
(1998) Dismissal (1998) (1994)
Austria 4.3 2.9 46.2
Belgium 1.8 1.7 51.2
Denmark 1.5 1.5 71.4
France 3.0 2.6 9.8
Greece 2.8 2.3 n.a.
Ireland 2.0 2.3 49.6
Italy 3.3 1.6 38.8
The Netherlands 3.3 1.8 25.5
Portugal 4.5 3.1 31.8
Spain 3.3 4.3 11.0
Note: Measures produced by the OECD.
In this section I illustrate that there is evidence supporting these intuitions. In
Section 4.1, I measure how signicant is the best economic condition eect in dierent
countries with dierent institutional backgrounds and union pressures. An interesting
exercise is analyzing the covariance between the prevalence of the best economic condi-
tion eect and an index of asymmetries in wage renegotiation. For this purpose, I use
indexes produced by the OECD measuring diculty of dismissal, employment protec-
20tion and union density for the selected sample of countries. Table 6 presents measures
of the diculty of dismissal and union pressure for dierent countries produced by the
OECD.
I consider the coecient of the minimum unemployment estimated by within-groups
regressions reported in Table 3 as the size of the best economic condition eect. These
coecients have been estimated in regressions where only the current and minimum
unemployment rate were considered and taking into account real wages.26 As coe-
cients are negative, the stronger the eect, the smaller the coecient. Therefore, we
expect negative correlation with these indexes.
Table 7: Renegotiation Power
Diculty of Overall Strictness Union
Dismissal - DOD Protection against Density
(1998) Dismissal (1998) (1994)
Min. Unemployment Covariance -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.02
Rate Coecient Correlation -7.73% -8.42% -8.62%
Correlations and covariances are reported in Table 7. Results illustrate that there is
a positive association between the strength of downward wage rigidity and institutional
backgrounds constraining the bargaining power of rms in ongoing matches. These
results suggest that models should take into account that rms are less mobile than
workers to renegotiate wages. Consequently, continuous Nash bargaining may not be
the best alternative to describe the renegotiation process.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I study the impact of downward wage rigidity over labor market dynam-
ics. Three main contributions stood out.
Firstly, I propose a matching model with cyclical uctuations in productivity, en-
dogenous job-termination and on-the-job search where downward wage rigidity is im-
posed. Simulating the model, I demonstrate that it predicts procyclical quits, coun-
tercyclical layos and countercyclical unemployment rates. I also show that with some
reasonable parameters, the model partially tackles the critique presented by Shimer
(2005) of scarce variability of vacancies and unemployment of standard matching mod-
els.
Secondly, I provide evidence of downward wage rigidity for ten European Coun-
tries using the ECHP. Downward wage rigidity is detected by analyzing the relation-
ship between wages and general economic conditions. Although this approach is less
26Taking into account coecients estimated in regressions where nominal wages are in left hand
side, estimated covariances are qualitatively similar.
21straightforward than the standard strategy, that directly measures changes in wages,
it is robust to measurement error in self-reported wages.
Thirdly, with microdata from the same set of countries, I analyze the cyclical pat-
terns of job termination. The estimates of the separation model parameters imply a
strong negative relationship between unemployment rates and quits at the European
level. I nd a signicantly positive eect of the unemployment rate over the probabil-
ity of layo. These results suggest that in Europe quits are procyclical and layos are
countercyclical, as predicted by the model.
I nally connect the evidence in favor downward wage rigidity with indexes of asym-
metry between rms and workers in the renegotiation of wages. I nd that in countries
where dismissing a worker is harder or where unions are stronger, downward wage
rigidity is more intense. Taking this evidence into account it would be interesting to
explicitly model asymmetries in the renegotiation process. Future models should con-
sider that the wage bargaining process when the worker is an insider may be dierent
from the wage bargaining process when the worker is an outsider.
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A Appendix
A.1 Simulations of the model
Although the model is simple, it is not straightforward to obtain a closed form solution
for the wage. The model is therefore simulated to have a better understanding of its
25predictions and to be able to compare them with some stylized facts concerning the
cyclical behavior of wages and labor market dynamics.27 I proceed as follow.
The value of a job for the rm and the value of being employed and of being unem-
ployed are solved by value function iterations, for each possible state. The distribution
of match heterogeneity in terms of i is assumed to be discrete. There are 6 dierent
elasticity levels evenly partitioning the interval [0,1]. The distribution of states of the
economy is also discretized, with three possible states. The best economic condition is
also a state variable. There are six (ie : factorial of the number of possible states of
the economy) possible states for each kind of match in term of yt and y
i;t, that makes
a total of 36 possible states. The six possible states for a given value of  are.
0
@
(y = y1;y = y1;) (y = y1;y = y2;) (y = y1;y = y3;)
  (y = y2;y = y2;) (y = y2;y = y3;)
    (y = y3;y = y3;)
1
A
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), I calculate the value functions in steady
state, without taking into account transition in employment ratios.
Due to the downward rigidity in wages, There are only three possible values of
wages for each type of match dened in term of i. As is has been assumed that when
y
















The dynamics of y
i;t is totally described by the dynamics of the aggregate shock, yt.









Which give an autocorrelation coecient of 0:96 in the aggregate shock, which is the
same autocorrelation coecient used by Fonseca and Mu~ noz (2003) when calibrating
a matching model for the Spanish economy.
There is no clear reference on how to choose , the exogenous rate of destruction.
Mortensen (1993) calibrated his model with = 0.5 percent. But Christensen, Lentz,
Mortensen, Neuman and Werwatz (2004) using Danish data estimates a matching
model with on-the-job search and the resultant exogenous rate of destruction was
28.33 percent. I use a  = 5% consistent with Davis, Haltiwanger and Shub, (1996).
27For simplicity I have showed the model equations assuming that there is no exogenous rate
of destruction, in simulations I assume an exogenous rate . The model equations including this
parameter are presented in Section A.2.
26The symmetric bargaining outcome,  = 0:5, is assumed following Mortensen
(1993). This is the solution in the case of a symmetric bargaining game. It is also con-
sistent with structural estimation of similar models with on-the-job search but without
counteroers by Flinn and Mabli (2011) with U.S. data and by Bartolucci (2011), with
German data.
I assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function m(v(y);u(y)) = u(y)v(y)(1 ). The
advantage of this functional form is that if the free entry condition holds, the probability
of nding a job and the probability of lling a vacancy do not depend directly on the
tightness of the market, they only depend on the expected value of a job for the rm.
28 I impose  = 0:5, this elasticity parameter of the matching function is equal to the
bargaining power, hence the Hosios condition holds.29
The search intensity while employed is  = 0:20 like in Mortensen (1993). A
summary of this parametrization is presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Parameter values for simulation
 (Worker share of Surplus) 0.50  (On-the-job search eciency) 0.20
c2 (Searching Cost) 0.50  (Productivity autocorrelation) 0.96
r (Interest rate) 0.05  (Matching function parameter) 0.50
b (Unemployment benets) 1.00  (Exogenous destruction rate) 0.05
A.2 Model equations with an exogenous rate of destruction
In the model presented in Section 2 there was no exogenous destruction. In order to
calibrate the model I allow for exogenous destruction. Every period matches will be
destroyed with probability :
The value of a vacancy and the value of the unemployment are the exactly the same
than before:
The Value of a Job for the Worker has an extra term due to the probability of

























28This statement's proof is in the appendix.
29This condition says that in an economy like the present one, rm entry is socially ecient when
the surplus sharing parameter, , is equal to the elasticity parameter of the matching function, : See
Hosios (1990).
27Where (yt;y






















































The value of a job for the rm also has an extra term driven by the exogenous
destruction rate:
J(yt;y
i;t;i) = p + iyt   w(y
i;t;i) +







































































With similar interpretations than the original equations.
A.2.1 Proof that probabilities of lling a vacancy and nding a job only
depend on the value functions
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This probability only depends on dierent values of jobs for the rm, the actual
economic condition and the cost of posting a vacancy.
A.3 Model's calibration
In this rst approximation to the model calibration, I used much of the parameter
values commented in section 3. I have only reduced the variability of yt from 0.84 to
0.35 and the exogenous destruction rate  from 5% to 4%.
I then reach reasonable values for the unemployment rate for European Economies30.
The mean unemployment rate conditioned to recession, 15.77 percent and conditioned






Cyclical component (yt) 0.36 3.64 28.75 0.96
Mean productivity 10.37 1.60 0.15 0.95
Vacancies (v(yt)) 0.02 0.01 0.49 0.60
Unemployment(u(yt)) 0.12 0.08 0.73 0.67
v(yt)=u(yt) 0.155 0.055 0.357 0.951
30See gure 3.
29This calibration is tentative, the only dimensions that have been calibrated in
equilibrium are productivity autocorrelation and the unemployment rate. As it was
stated above, this calibration only wants to show that imposing downward wage rigidity
may help to generate more variability in vacancies and unemployment with the same
dispersion in productivity. In this model vacancy-unemployment ratio varies more than
twice than productivity, that was the original critic made in Shimer (2005).
A.4 Additional Tables
Table 9: Wage Rigidity - Austria
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.08 -0.05 0.09 -0.08 -0.02 0.06 levels
(8.38)** (3.54)** (6.66)** (7.87)** (1.44) (4.24)**
(2) -0.11 0.03 -0.1 0.04 levels
(14.11)** (5.99)** (11.76)** (5.90)**
(3) -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 job-xed
(3.80)** (3.97)** (6.62)** -0.56) eects
Log(monthly real wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(4) -0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 levels
(5.41)** (3.27)** (1.77) (4.98)** (1.45) (0.24)
(5) -0.07 0.02 -0.06 0.02 levels
(8.47)** (2.86)** (6.84)** (2.58)**
(6) -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 job-xed
(4.54)** (3.24)** (3.65)** (3.11)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
30Table 10: Wage Rigidity - Belgium
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.00 levels
(13.85)** (3.19)** (0.98) (17.21)** (0.08) (0.57)
(2) -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 levels
(17.04)** (2.54)* (19.61)** (0.42)
(3) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 job-xed
(2.37)* (1.93) (3.67)** (1.51) eects
Log(monthly real wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.027 0.003 -0.005 levels
(4.98)** (1.45) (4.41)** (8.38)** (0.92) (0.97)
(2) -0.02 -0.01 -0.03) 0.00 levels
(6.77)** (3.57)** (9.31)** (0.48)
(3) -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 job-xed
(-0.49) (-1.85) (1.12) (2.34)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
31Table 11: Wage Rigidity - Denmark
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.00 levels
(7.32)** (4.79)** (2.19)* (14.90)** (1.47) (0.01)
(2) -0.05 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 levels
(10.53)** (8.09)** (19.83)** (2.19)*
(3) 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 job-xed
(4.02)** (4.90)** (1.27) (3.00)** eects
Log(real nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 0.002 -0.01 levels
(0.19) (1.67) (4.60)** (9.18)** (0.61) (1.01)
(2) -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 levels
(1.82) (7.17)** (12.66)** (0.89)
(3) 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 job-xed
(2.81)** (4.67)** (0.45) (3.87)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
32Table 12: Wage Rigidity - France
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 levels
(10.16)** (2.42)* (1.70) (14.76)** (4.73)** (1.74)
(5) -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.02 levels
(15.75)** (2.74)** (20.12)** (5.34)**
(6) 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 job-xed
(1.36) (8.36)** (2.20)* (6.91)** eects
Log(real nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 levels
(5.38)** (1.76) (1.97)* (10.53)** (1.93) (4.43)**
(2) -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 levels
(8.96)** (1.65) (13.93)** (4.32)**
(3) -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 job-xed
(2.48)* (7.66)** (4.32)** (5.79)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
33Table 13: Wage Rigidity - Greece
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) 0.11 0.19 -0.08 0.10 0.18 -0.07 levels
(22.55)** (11.89)** (6.36)** (19.03)** (9.88)** (5.19)**
(5) 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.07 levels
(31.79)** (18.37)** (26.45)** (14.84)**
(6) 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.11 job-xed
(12.80)** (7.97)** (11.83)** (8.56)** eects
Log(real nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) 0.06 -0.05 0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.11 levels
(12.66)** (3.87)** (6.76)** (11.36)** (3.08)** (5.90)**
(2) 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.04 levels
(18.61)** (8.51)** (16.10)** (8.19)**
(3) 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.08 job-xed
(9.07)** (0.92) (4.90) (1.23) eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
34Table 14: Wage Rigidity - Ireland
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) 0.03 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 levels
(3.67)** (8.92)** (5.15)** (0.87) (2.44)* (6.89)**
(5) -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 levels
(7.31)** (13.32)** (9.88)** (6.76)**
(6) 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 job-xed
(4.54)** (5.72)** (2.53)* (2.75)** eects
Log(real nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 levels
(5.47)** (4.14)** (8.95)** (0.07) (5.65)** (2.33)*
(2) -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 levels
(1.86) (12.94)** (5.99)** (6.25)**
(3) 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 job-xed
(3.12)** (4.50)** (4.76)** (4.22)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
35Table 15: Wage Rigidity - Italy
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.11 0.04 -0.01 -0.10 0.04 -0.01 levels
(29.27)** (7.29)** (1.28) (25.99)** (8.26)** (1.22)
(5) -0.1 0.04 -0.09 0.05 levels
(36.86)** (14.67)** (32.40)** (17.20)**
(6) 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 job-xed
(3.85)** (3.13)** (4.87)** -1.15 eects
Log(real nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 levels
(15.46)** (1.74) (3.07)** (13.41)** (1.26) (5.14)**
(2) -0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.03 levels
(20.10)** (4.83)** (16.72)** (10.26)**
(3) 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 job-xed
(1.77) (2.42)* (0.43) (2.56)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
36Table 16: Wage Rigidity - The Netherlands
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 levels
(2.32)* (12.50)** (6.83)** (10.74)** (3.38)** (3.32)**
(2) -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 levels
(16.06)** (7.08)** (20.41)** (2.14)*
(3) 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 job-xed
(0.07) (5.02)** (3.39)** (2.27)* eects
Log(real nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) 0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 0.009 -0.02 levels
(2.50)* (7.02)** (11.88)** (6.58)** (3.52)** (2.41)*
(2) -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 levels
(8.19)** (6.15)** (13.04)** (0.88)
(3) -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 job-xed
(3.50)** (3.22)** (4.12)** (4.01)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
37Table 17: Wage Rigidity - Portugal
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 levels
(50.54)** (2.52)* (3.28)** (40.78)** (0.55) (3.67)**
(2) -0.10 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 levels
(53.77)** (0.32) (44.54)** (2.44)*
(3) 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 job-xed
(5.27)** (4.17)** (7.32)** (4.20)** eects
Log(real nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.06 -0.004 0.003 -0.06 -0.01 -0.004 levels
(30.81)** (1.93) (0.90) (24.63)** (2.79)** (0.97)
(2) -0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 levels
(32.81)** (0.30) (27.03)** (2.23)*
(3) 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 job-xed
(2.43)* (3.79)** (1.99)* (4.74)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
38Table 18: Wage Rigidity - Spain
Log(monthly nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0 levels
(19.69)** (4.85)** (0.06) (18.94)** (1.66) (2.00)*
(2) -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 levels
(30.60)** (9.33)** (30.17)** (4.60)**
(3) 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 job-xed
(0.20) (7.81)** (0.64) (5.73)** eects
Log(real nominal wages)
All Types of Contracts Permanent Contracts
Actual Minimum Initial Actual Minimum Initial
rate rate rate rate rate rate
(1) -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.004 -0.01 levels
(8.45)** (0.28) (5.42)** (10.67)** (2.01)* (1.34)
(2) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 levels
(14.40)** (9.72)** (16.37)** (4.27)**
(3) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 job-xed
(2.93)** (7.04)** (2.65)** (6.12)** eects
Note: Each row in the rst three columns represents a wage equation where workers with every type
of contracts are considered. Each row in the last three columns represents a wage equation where
only workers with permanent contracts are considered. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.**
signicant at 1%; * signicant at 5%. Controls for age, tenure, education and dummies for country,
sex, type of contract, marital status and immigration status are included.
39